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The Clinton-Obama Approach to
Medical Malpractice Reform:
Reviving the Most Meaningful
Features of Alternative Dispute
Resolution
Grant Wood Geckeler'
I. INTRODUCTION
"Most medical malpractice lawsuits are frivolous." "High insurance
premiums are driving obstetricians into early retirement." "Jury verdicts
usually result in huge awards to plaintiffs." "More tort reforms will solve
these problems." These sound bytes encapsulate many of the conventional
justifications for the recent surges in medical malpractice liability insurance
premiums-what has been called the first medical malpractice crisis of the
2twenty-first century.
An introduction to medical malpractice reform would be incomplete
without mentioning the Institute of Medicine's (10M) 1999 report, To Err is
Human: Building a Safer Health System, which lists medical errors as the
eighth leading cause of death in the United States.3 While much attention
1. Grant Wood Geckeler is a JD/MBA candidate at the Pepperdine University School of Law
and Graziadio School of Business and Management who will graduate in May 2009. Mr. Geckeler
is also pursuing a certificate at the Straus Institute for Dispute Resolution. He would like to thank
his father, William Robert Geckeler, MD, and Kenneth R. Pedroza, Esq. for sharing their guidance
and expertise in the medical and legal fields, although their views are not necessarily reflected in this
article.
2. William M. Sage, Medical Liability and Patient Safety, 22 HEALTH AFF. 26, 27, n.4
(2003).
3. THE INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH CARE
SYSTEM 1-2 (Nat'l Academy Press 2000). The report, published in 1999, estimated that 98,000
medical error-related deaths occurred every year in the United States. Id. The IOM report is one of
the most cited sources for introducing the epidemic of medical malpractice and error in the United
States. See generally TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH (Univ. of Chicago 2005)
1
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has been paid to the prevalence of medical error and increases in liability
premiums, the media's recent interest in the application of alternative
dispute resolution (ADR) tactics in medical malpractice cases has
increased.4 The quest for a one-size-fits-all fix to rising health care costs has
turned to ADR for guidance in the past, with hopes that binding arbitration
and voluntary mediation would resolve the crisis.' Recently, the search has
unearthed a new and somewhat counterintuitive champion: the early
settlement of potential malpractice claims through the combination of
medical error disclosure and apology.
6
The IOM's report recommends a strategy for improvement based on
health care organizations' ability to learn "from errors by developing a
nationwide... reporting system" and encouraging healthcare providers "to
develop and participate in voluntary reporting systems."7  Introduced six
years after the publication of IOM's recommendations, Senate Bill 1784,
"The National Medical Error and Compensation (MEDiC) Act of 2005" 8
stood the best chance of realizing the report's normative advice. The
MEDiC Act, introduced by Senators Hillary Rodham Clinton and Barack
Obama, is modeled after several successful state programs that have
effectively reduced the occurrence of medical errors while simultaneously
reducing legal costs. 9 The bill contains incentives for physicians to disclose
medical errors to patients and participate in a national medical error
(citing the IOM report as a common source for nationwide statistics relating to medical malpractice
and error).
4. See BAKER, supra note 3, at 22-24.
5. See Carol B. Liebman & Chris S. Hyman, A Mediation Skills Model to Manage Disclosure
of Errors and Adverse Events to Patients: A quicker, less alienating route to closure than
malpractice litigation, 23 HEALTH AFF. 22, 22 (2004) (discussing the extensive research that has
been conducted on the use of mediation to manage communications with patients); Nicholas Terry,
The Technical and Conceptual Flaws of Medical Malpractice Arbitration, 30 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 571,
629 (1986) (discussing the debate over the application of arbitration to medical malpractice cases).
6. Hillary Rodham Clinton & Barack Obama, Making Patient Safety the Centerpiece of
Medical Liability Reform, 354 NEw ENG. J. MED. 2205, 2205 (2006). In 1987, the Veterans Affairs
(VA) Hospital in Lexington, Kentucky pioneered a policy that combined the full disclosure of
medical errors with appropriate expressions of empathy and some early offers of compensation to its
injured patients. Id. at 2207. Several other institutions, the most notable of which include the
University of Michigan Healthcare System (UMHS) and Children's Hospitals and Clinics of
Minnesota, have successfully adopted similar programs. Id. at 2207-08; 109 CONG. REC. S10599
(daily ed. Sep. 28, 2005) (statement of Sen. Clinton).
7. THE INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 3, at 3.
8. The National Medical Disclosure and Compensation (MEDiC) Act of 2005, S. 1784, 109th
Cong. (1st Sess. 2005).
9. S. 1784, § 1. The UMHS, VA, and Children's Hospitals have reduced their legal
administrative costs by a statistically significant amount since adopting their respective policies.
Clinton & Obama, supra note 6, at 2207; 109 CONG. REC. S10599 (daily ed. Sep. 28, 2005)
(statement of Sen. Clinton).
2
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reporting system.'o The remainder of this article will analyze the recurring
problems inherent in the medical malpractice environment, explore a portion
of ADR's impact on the reformation of this environment, and offer the
MEDiC Act as ADR's contemporary solution for a more equitable and
sustainable medical malpractice environment.
II. THE PROBLEMS
The current medical malpractice environment must be examined in light
of the amalgamated changes adopted since the last malpractice crisis of the
1980's. 1"
A. The Volatility of Insurance Markets
Most Americans think malpractice lawsuits are the number one cause of
soaring insurance premium rates. 12  The American Medical Association
(AMA) contends that "the litigation system is ... raising the costs of health
care for all Americans."' 13 However, a recent academic study by Dartmouth
College researchers asserts the contrary is true. 14  The Dartmouth study
determined that increases in physician malpractice payments between 1991
and 2003 were consistent with general increases in health care costs.15 The
researchers' findings directly rebutted the AMA's contentions by
demonstrating that large jury awards were not responsible for the significant
10. S. 1784, §§ 3-935.
11. Sage, supra note 2, at 27-31.
12. BAKER, supra note 3, at 45. According to the American Medical Association, "82% of
Americans believe that physicians are being forced to leave their practices because excessive
litigation puts the cost of liability insurance out of reach." AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION,
MEDICAL LIABILITY REFORM - NOW! 4 (July 19, 2006) http://www.ama-assn.org/amal/pub/upload/
mm/-I/mlrnow.pdf.
13. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 12, at 6.
14. See Liz Kowalczyk, Rising Doctors' Premiums Not Due to Lawsuit Awards, BOSTON
GLOBE, June 1, 2005, at D I (describing the findings of the Dartmouth researchers).
15. See Amitabh Chandra et al., The Growth of Physician Medical Malpractice Payments:
Evidence From the National Practitioner Data Bank, 24 HEALTH AFF. 240, 240 (2005). The
researchers examined data from the National Practitioner Data Bank and found that the
overwhelming majority (ninety-six percent) of physician malpractice payments come from
settlements. Id. Judgments at trial accounted "for less than 4 percent of all payments and 5 percent
of all medical malpractice dollars." Id. at 242.
173
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magnitude of recent malpractice payment growth. 16  Moreover, the study
demonstrates that "the current increase in premiums is not attributable to the
increase in [physician malpractice] payments."' 17
Professor Tom Baker tenders an explanation for the lack of causal
relationship between rising insurance premiums and malpractice payments:
the boom-and-bust cycle of the liability insurance market. 18  In short,
Baker's research suggests that the insurance underwriting cycle creates
medical malpractice insurance crises when insurance companies rapidly
increase rates to make up for losses incurred from the mismanagement of
soft markets. 19  Data shows that the insurance industry as a whole
underpriced actual losses between 1987 and 2001.20 That underpricing of
liability insurance explains the sudden increase in premium rates beginning
in 1996 as well as the continuation of premium rate increases well into the
foreseeable future. 21 The above average rise in premium rates beginning in
1999-what many refer to as the prelude to the present medical malpractice
crisis-was exacerbated by widespread declines in insurers' investment
income. 22  Insurers' lower-than-expected return on investment incomes
16. Id. at 242. The Dartmouth study found "that growth of the top 10 percent of payments
[was] smaller than that of the average payment." Id. at 247.
17. Id. at 246-47. A new report suggests medical liability costs have risen an average of
11.7% per year since 1975. TILLINGHAST-TOWERS PERRIN, U.S. TORT COSTS AND CROSS-BORDER
PERSPECTIVES: 2005 UPDATE 10 (2006), available at http://www.towersperrin.com/tillinghast
/publications/reports/2005_TortCost/2005_Tort.pdf. However, these cost increases have been quite
erratic as opposed to the relatively constant increases in physician malpractice payments. See
Chandra, supra note 15, at 243.
18. See generally BAKER, supra note 3, at 45-67. A simplistic description of this cycle begins
with the over-reserving of payments in proportion to the relatively low levels of future losses
predicted by insurers-the "boom" of the cycle. Id. at 51. This under-allocation of risk results in
prices that do not fully cover the insurer's actual risk level. Id. Unlike other liability insurance
schemes, the long time lag between medical malpractice litigation filing and award payment result in
late detections of under-reserving. Id. at 52. Insurers are not able to determine a fiscal year's actual
losses until approximately 9 years after the event corresponding to the loss payment. Id. at 53.
When insurers realize they have both under-reserved and underestimated payment rates, they
metaphorically "bust." Id. at 66. Insurers then simultaneously increase the level of predicted losses
and enlarge their payment reserves. Id. This translates into higher prices that over-emphasize the
insurer's actual level of risk. Id. at 66-67.
19. See id. at 45-67.
20. See id. at 51-58.
21. Id.
22. See Chandra, supra note 15, at 246-47. The Dartmouth researchers found evidence that
recent premium increases were partially correlated to lower-than-predicted returns from insurers'
investment activities. Id. Malpractice liability insurers experienced substantial declines in income
from major bond holdings between 1998 and 2001. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE INSURANCE: MULTIPLE FACTORS HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO INCREASED PREMIUM
RATES 20 (2003).
174
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coincided with the beginning of their "bust" cycle.23 By the end of 2002,
volatile insurance premium increases confirmed what many industry experts
were predicting-the start of our nation's third medical malpractice crisis.
24
B. High Rates of Medical Error
Since late in the twentieth century, several notable researchers and
policymakers have obviated the traditional "blame the lawyers" approach to
analyzing rising medical malpractice insurance costs in the face of several
notable studies that have negated such a position. 25  The 1999 IOM report
found evidence that medical errors are responsible for the deaths of 98,000
patients annually in the United States.26  Even more startling is the
proposition that the majority of the deaths measured by the study were
causally linked to a single, or small series of human or system errors capable
of prevention by simple and inexpensive safeguards.27 In over ninety
percent of these deaths, there was no verifiable physician negligence.28
Instead, failed hospital systems and procedures were causal factors in more
than nine out of every ten deaths measured by the IOM report.29
The sad reality is that despite extensive research, the general public is
mostly unaware that the occurrence of preventable medical errors is so
widespread. As early as 1974, studies began to unveil that a startling
23. See BAKER, supra note 3, at 51-58. Insurers had generally postponed raising premiums to
cover their marginal losses from predicted income streams coming from bonds. Id. However, by
2001, it became apparent that an upward premium adjustment was needed to cover these marginal
losses. See Kenneth Thorpe, The Medical Malpractice 'Crisis': Recent Trends and the Impact of
State Tort Reforms, HEALTH AFF, Jan. 21, 2004, http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/full/
hlthaff.w4.20vl/DCI#10. In early 2002, the three largest national medical malpractice insurers
raised rates in reflection of higher than expected loss payments during the course of the early 1990's
and increasing current/future risk projections. See BAKER, supra note 3, at 2.
24. See BAKER, supra note 3, at 2.
25. THE INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 3, at 1-2. The report, published by the Institute
of Medicine, sparked great debate upon its publication and has been scrutinized in a number of
follow-up studies. See BAKER, supra note 3, at 2; see also Bryan A. Liang, The Adverse Event of
Unaddressed Medical Error: Identifying and Filling the Holes in the Health-Care and Legal
Systems, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 346 (2001) for a discussion of how the reality of human error has
been widely ignored in the U.S. healthcare system.
26. See THE INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 3, at 1.
27. See Clinton & Obama, supra note 6, at 2205.
28. Id.
29. Id.
175
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percentage of patients experienced injury from medical errors.3 ° The 1974
Medical Insurance Feasibility Study found that one out of every twenty
discharged patients suffered injury as a result of a medical error.31 The
subsequent Harvard Medical Practice Study (HMPS) found a high incidence
of adverse medical events which caused 27,000 injuries in New York
hospitals during 1984.32 The HMPS researchers defined "adverse events" as
"situations in which an inappropriate decision was made when, at the time,
an appropriate alternative could have been chosen." 33  The researchers
established that there was an adverse event in nearly half of the
hospitalizations 34 and that the adverse event was deemed to be serious in
eighteen percent of the hospitalizations.35  Indeed, a later hospital
observation study in Chicago calculated that some form of mistake was
made on almost half of the study's patients and that these mistakes
"seriously injured nearly 20 percent of those patients, causing anything from
temporary disability to death.,
36
C. Low Levels of Compensation
Of the large pool of patients suffering some form of injury as a result of
medical errors, a miniscule portion is offered early or informal
compensation. Data from studies conducted in New York, Utah, Colorado,
and Chicago show that only between two and four percent of patients who
suffer a serious injury caused by medical malpractice actually initiate
litigation.37 However, in those studies, insurance companies and hospitals
generally offered compensation only to a fraction of patients who pursued
30. See CAL. MED. Ass'N & CAL. HOSP. AS'N, REPORT ON THE MEDICAL INSURANCE
FEASIBILITY STUDY (Donald Harper Mills ed., 1977); see also Donald Harper Mills, Medical
Insurance Feasibility Study: A Technical Summary, 128 W. J. MED. 360 (1978). Sadly, of the
injured patients sampled, roughly ten percent died from their sustained injuries. See BAKER, supra
note 3, at 26. Extrapolating this data, the researchers determined that 140,000 patients were injured
by a medical error in the state of California during 1974. CAL. MED. ASS'N & CAL. HOSP. ASS'N at
47-53. Similarly, they determined 14,000 patients were killed by a medical error in the state of
California during 1974. Id.
31. BAKER, supra note 3, at 25-26.
32. Tom Baker, Reconsidering the Harvard Medical Practice Study Conclusions About the
Validity of Medical Malpractice Claims, 33 J.L. MED. & ETH. 501, 502 (2005).
33. S. 1. Chaudry, K. A. Olofinboba & H. M. Krumholz, Detection of Errors by Attending
Physicians on a General Medical Service, 18 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 594, 594-600 (2003); Baker,
supra note 32, at 505.
34. Baker, supra note 32, at 505- Not every adverse event measured resulted in a quantifiablc
injury. Id.
35. id. A "serious" event is an event that produced at least a temporary physical disability. Id.
36. BAKER, supra note 3, at 35.
37. Id. at 69; see also Baker, supra note 32, at 501-05.
6
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legal recourse. 8 The overwhelming majority of patients who experienced
quantifiable injury from medical malpractice, but did not sue, were never
offered monetary compensation for the injuries and inconveniences they
sustained.39 Of the patients who did sue, the HMPS "found that the tort
system fails to compensate the majority of patients injured by their medical
care."
40
D. Low Levels of Litigation
The initiation of litigation has traditionally been the primary means by
which injured patients obtain monetary compensation. 41  The level of
compensation among the pool of patients injured by medical error is very
small, which leads one to speculate that few injured patients actually sue.42
Research confirms this supposition. For example, contrary to news
headlines, most patients who suffer a medical error or malpractice-related
injury do not sue.43 Data from empirical evidence and observational studies
suggests the there are almost ten incidences of medical malpractice for every
one malpractice claim. 44 Since medical errors do not always amount to the
legal definition of medical malpractice, one can assume that the rate of
medical errors to malpractice claims is even higher.4 5
E. A Culture of Silence
Numerous studies have listed "a general lack of communication" or
"suspicion of a cover-up" as primary factors in plaintiffs' decisions to file
38. BAKER, supra note 3, at 69.
39. See id. at 69-73.
40. Liebman & Hyman, supra note 5, at 22.
41. See Terry, supra note 5, at 571-80.
42. BAKER, supra note 3, at 91.
43. See id. at 22-25, 69-73.
44. See BAKER, supra note 3, at 69. Dr. Patricia Danzon suggests that because hospital record
reviews miss many instances of malpractice, the actual rate of malpractice may be even higher. See
PATRICIA DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND PUBLIC POLICY 21-25
(Harvard Univ. Press 1985). Harvard researchers determined there were seven occurrences of
malpractice for every litigation filing in their sampling. Russell Localio et al., Relation Between
Medical Malpractice Claims and Adverse Events Due to Negligence, Results of the Harvard Medical
Practice Study I1, 325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 245-51 (1991). In a Utah study, a five-to-one ratio was
found. Studdert, David, et al., Negligent Care and Malpractice Claiming Behavior in Utah and
Colorado, 38 MED. CARE 250 (2000).
45. See DANZON, supra note 44; see also Localio, supra note 44, at 247-50.
7
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malpractice litigation. 46  One study indicated that seventy-six percent of
physicians polled said they had failed to disclose a serious medical error to
one or more of their patients.47 In a controlled series of focus groups,
researchers determined that [m]any physicians said that fear of litigation
limited what they tell patients about errors., 4 8 This fear of litigation creates
a culture of silence in modem physician-patient communications, but such
trepidation is largely misplaced. 49 A HMPS follow-up study confirmed that
physicians' perceived risk of being sued was greater than three times the
actual risk. 0 Other key studies have demonstrated that sharing medical
errors can actually decrease physicians' likelihood of being sued, yet the
concept of the "sue-happy" patient remains widely intact across most
disciplines in the medical profession.51 Such skepticism not only reinforces
46. See J. Avery, Lawyers Tell What Turns Some Patients Litigious, 2 MED. MALPRACTICE
REV. 35, 35-37 (1985); see also Thomas May & Mark Aulisio, Medical Malpractice, Mistake
Prevention, and Compensation, II KENNEDY INST. ETH. J. 135, 135-46 (2001). Avery estimates
that 70 to 80% of medical malpractice litigation involves failed physician-patient communication.
Id. at 135. Another study interviewed plaintiffs of 127 closed Florida malpractice claims between
1986 and August 1989. G. B. Hickson, et al., Factors that Prompted Families to File Medical
Malpractice Claims Following Perinatal Injuries, 267 JAMA 1359, 1359-63 (1992). Interviewees
provided many unexpected reasons for filing. Id. at 1359. Twenty-four percent of plaintiffs
responded that they "recognized a cover-up." Id. Twenty percent said they felt it was the only way
to obtain the "information they needed." Id. Nineteen percent wanted to seek revenge or protect
others from harm. Id. "Families expressed [a general] dissatisfaction with physician-patient
communication." Id. Thirty-two percent of plaintiffs believed that physicians were afraid to, or
were not able to talk openly. Id. An overwhelming 48% thought that their physician(s) had
attempted to mislead them. Id. "Malpractice suits are often prompted by the desire to obtain
explanations for unexpected tragedies or to overcome failures of empathy and communication by
physicians." Sage, supra note 2, at 31.
47. Albert W. Wu et al., Do House Officers Learn From Their Mistakes?, 265 JAMA 2089,
2089-94 (1991).
48. Thomas H. Gallagher et al., Patients' and Physicians' Attitudes Regarding the Disclosure
of Medical Errors, 289 JAMA 1001, 1001-07 (2003). One of the forty-six physicians who
participated in the focus groups elaborated:
Everything you read and everything that you're told says that you are supposed to tell
what errors you make as soon as you can. Let them know what your thinking is, what
you are going to do about it. And your chances of having an adverse litigation are less if
you take that approach. Now, the question is, how many of us believe that?
Id. at 1004.
49. See May & Aulisio, supra note 46, at 137 (for a description of how physicians' fear of
litigation "engenders a climate of fear that inhibits open reporting of errors").
50. See Harvard Medical Practice Study, Patients, Doctors, and Lawyers: Medical Injury,
Malpractice Litigation, and Patient Compensation in New York: The report of the Harvard Medical
Practice Study to the State of New York (1990), http://www.nysl.nysed.gov/scandoclinks/
OCM21331963.htm.
51. Amanda Craig, A Physician 's Perspective on the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 13 ANNALS
HEALTH L. 623, 625-26 (2004).
178
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the culture of silence and fear for new physicians, but also acts as the
primary impediment to the implementation of patient safety improvements.
52
The open communication of medical errors is just as important as the
discussion of medical success to the development of meaningful patient
safety improvements. 13 Yet physicians seem to be increasingly reluctant to
discuss patient safety and quality improvements with their peers and
colleagues.54 In fact, a 2002 report by the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) determined that as many as ninety-five percent of
doctors "are reluctant to collect quality-related information and work
together to act on it for fear that it will be used against them or their
colleagues in a lawsuit."5 5  But open channels of communication and
collaboration among physicians is exactly what is needed to ascertain how to
best improve patient safety.56
III. ADR's MOST PREVALENT RESPONSE: VOLUNTARY BINDING
ARBITRATION
Of the current alternative dispute resolution vehicles used by healthcare
providers today, voluntary binding arbitration 57 is perhaps the most widely
52. Craig, supra note 51, at 625-26. The "climate of fear... is exacerbated by psychological
feelings of stress and shame associated with malpractice." May & Aulisio, supra note 46, at 137.
This climate of fear is responsible for much of the resistance healthcare providers have to openly
disclosing errors and negligence. Id.
53. Id. at 626.
54. Id.
55. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, CONFRONTING THE NEW HEALTH
CARE CRISIS: IMPROVING HEALTH 'CARE QUALITY AND LOWERING COSTS BY FIXING OUR MEDICAL
LIABILITY SYSTEM 3 (July 2002), available at http://www.aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/litrefm.pdf.
56. See Clinton & Obama, supra note 6, at 2205-08; see generally The National Medical
Disclosure and Compensation (MEDiC) Act of 2005, S. 1784, supra note 8.
Any effort to prevent injury due to medical care is complicated by the dead weight of a
litigation system that induces secrecy and silence. No matter how much we might insist
that physicians have an ethical duty to report injuries resulting from medical care or to
work on their prevention, fear of malpractice litigation drags us back to the status quo.
Troyen A. Brennan, The Institute of Medicine Report on Medical Errors: Could it do Harm? 342
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1123, 1125 (2000).
57. Binding arbitration produces a final decision that is binding on all interested parties.
Patricia I. Carter, Binding Arbitration in Malpractice Disputes: The Right Prescription for HMO
Patients?, 18 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 423, 423 n.2 (1997). On the other hand, non-binding
arbitration produces an advisory decision which may be rejected at the discretion of any party. Id.
9
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used. Most states have enacted legislation allowing and governing the use of
voluntary binding arbitration in medical malpractice cases. 8
A. Background
Elective arbitration procedures first surfaced in the 1970's as a cost
containment mechanism used by hospitals involved in medical malpractice
lawsuits.5 9 However, problems inherent with the nonbinding nature of these
arbitrations soon surfaced.6 ° Voluntary binding arbitration filled this gap,
and soon became the preeminent form of ADR employed by medical
professionals. 6' Today, many large Health Maintenace Organizations
(HMO) employ some form of voluntary binding arbitration for the resolution
of malpractice claims. 62  A smaller percentage of private physicians and
hospitals have also asked their patients to agree to remove malpractice
claims from the courtroom by consenting to binding arbitration
agreements.63 The physicians who use such binding arbitration schemes
claim that they: (1) present a more cost-effective resolution process than
litigation and (2) decrease the resolution time when compared to a traditional
medical malpractice trial. 64
58. Albert Yoon, Mandatory Arbitration and Civil Litigation: An Empirical Study of Medical
Malpractice Litigation in the West, 6 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 95, 101 (2004). South Dakota and South
Carolina have not. Carter, supra note 58, at 430.
59. Yoon, supra note 59, at 99.
60. Armand Leone, Jr., As Health Care Enterprise Liability Expands... Is ADR The RX For
Malpractice?, 49-SEP DISP. RESOL. J. 7, 10 (1994).
Unless arbitration is binding, neither party prepares the case for a full presentation with
the idea that it is best to keep something in reserve for use at the trial when the claim will
really be decided. Furthermore, without binding arbitration, the losing side in arbitration
gets two bites of the apple, and the benefits of reduced resolution time are lost.
Id.
61. Elizabeth Rolph et al., Arbitration Agreements in Health Care: Myths and Reality, 60 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 153, 158-60 (1997).
62. Karl Polzer, Emerging Issues in the Use of Binding Arbitration to Resolve Disputes
between Individuals and Health Plans, NAT'L HEALTH POL'Y F. 5 (2000). One RAND study found
that eight of the twenty California HMOs reported using binding arbitration agreements with
enrollees to resolve both contractual and medical malpractice disputes. Id. The RAND study also
found that about nine percent of hospitals (roughly twenty percent of annual California hospital
admissions) and nine percent of physicians surveyed used binding arbitration agreements to settle
medical malpractice claims. Id.
63. See Yoon, supra note 59. Some states have even experimented with using arbitration
screening panels to reduce the number of nonmeritous suits in their court systems. Id.
64. Carter, supra note 58, at 451.
180
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B. The Contemporary Debate
Arbitration has become a synonymous complement to many state-level
tort reform initiatives because of its professed advantages of economy and
speed.65 Statistical data from the American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists suggest that its California members who used arbitration
resolved their medical malpractice claims more quickly and for less money
than the national average. 6 6 One national HMO has previously reported that
"their arbitration cases last an average of nineteen months, compared with
thirty-three months for the court system. ' ' 67 This HMO also claimed its
arbitration system compensated a larger percentage of injured patients
compared to its prior experiences with malpractice litigation.68 Other
hospitals using similar arbitration techniques have reduced their legal
defense costs by as much as twenty percent. 69 Despite initial concerns that
arbitration may open the floodgates to frivolous litigation, research has
shown the contrary.70
However, the elusive benefits of medical malpractice arbitrations have
generally tended to be one-sided, in favor of physician users.71 Data has
shown that substituting litigation with binding arbitration may enlarge the
pool of injured patients who are awarded some form of compensation, but
compensation levels in arbitrated cases have proven to be much smaller than
65. See id.
66. D. Lawrence, The Market Is Already Doing It, WALL ST. J., Mar. 16, 1994, at A18, Col. 4.
However, this claim must be taken in context. At the time of the study, arbitrators hearing the
California malpractice disputes were bound by MICRA, and therefore capped any award of non-
economic damages at $250,000. NICHOLAS M. PACE, LAURA ZAKARAS & DANIELA GOLINELLI,
CAPPING NON-ECONOMIC AWARDS IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE TRIALS: CALIFORNIA JURY
VERDICTS UNDER MICRA, 47-48 (RAND 2004). At the time of the study, fewer than twenty states
had enacted any form non-economic caps on medical malpractice awards. Id. Comparing California
arbitration costs to national average litigation costs where the mean of states had not imposed similar
non-economic damage caps is akin to comparing apples and oranges. While arbitration alone may
have a marginalizing effect on awards, RAND research has shown that, in medical malpractice suits,
the imposition of a $250,000 non-economic award cap: (1) reduces defendants' liabilities by thirty
percent and (2) reduces attorney fees by sixty percent. See id.
67. Carter, supra note 58, at 439.
68. Id.
69. Leone, Jr., supra note 61, at 12.
70. Id. The observed frequency of all claims filed against hospitals using voluntary binding
arbitration declined by more than sixty percent. Id. "Most importantly, the defense costs of
resolving frivolous claims were reduced by 59%." Id.
71. Carter, supra note 58, at 449.
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similar jury awards.72 Although patients may pay less attorney fees during
the course of an arbitration, any savings will likely be completely offset by a
comparatively lower damage award."3  Another study of medical
malpractice in Nevada suggests that arbitration's most discernable effect is
the substantial reduction of claims resolved by the State's court system.
74
The Nevada study found that the use of arbitration had no statistically
significant effect on the time spent resolving claims, the amount insurers
paid to plaintiffs, or the amount insurers paid to process claims. 75  Recent
research into compensation levels of arbitrated medical malpractice cases
has produced contradictory sets of data and inconclusive findings.76 Such
economic comparisons between medical malpractice arbitration awards and
jury awards are difficult to derive because most information from binding
arbitration awards remains confidential.77
However, the chief criticisms of voluntary binding arbitration programs
are not driven by economic considerations. Many scholars and practitioners
have noted that voluntary binding arbitration policies do not accord with
traditional notions of alternative dispute resolution. 78 In fact, the auspices of
binding arbitration are closely aligned with those of traditional litigation, and
stand in contrast to nonbinding arbitration and mediation. However, binding
arbitration's mechanical departures from litigation favor physician users
more than patients. Foremost, arbitration is highly adversarial in nature.
Although more conciliatory than litigation, binding arbitration eclipses
nonbinding arbitration and mediation in terms of parties' hostilities towards
72. Id. at 438-39. Similarly, the GAO has determined that between 1977 and 1990 Michigan's
Medical Malpractice Arbitration Program reduced average awards by roughly thirty percent versus
litigated cases. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: ALTERNATIVES TO
LITIGATION, app. Ill-V at 23-29 (1992). The GAO's report determined that arbitration panels
awarded compensation to plaintiffs in only seventy of 272 claims, noting "defense costs to be
essentially the same in arbitration as in litigation." Carter, supra note 58, at 439.
73. See Polzer, supra note 63.
74. Yoon, supra note 59, at 131. This study compared trends in medical malpractice litigation
prior to and after the establishment of mandatory screening panel arbitration enacted by the Nevada
Legislature in 1986. Id. at 95-112. The screening panels, although rendering no award calculation,
may have functioned as a form of mandatory arbitration. Id. at 131. The panels were charged with
determining whether there was sufficient evidence to make a finding of liability. Id. at 102. If the
panel found liability and both parties accepted the panel's recommendation, the case was sent to
state court where an unassociated judge determined the monetary amount of damages awarded. Id.
75. Id. at 131. Plaintiffs' attorney expenditures were not assessed in the data analyzed by the
study. See id.
76. See id.
77. See Polzer, supra note 63, at 5.
78. See generally Jean R. Sternlight, Is Binding Arbitration a Form of ADR?: An Argument
that the Term "ADR" Has Begun to Outlive Its Usefulness, 2000 J. DisP. RESOL. 97 (2000).
182
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one another. 79  This climate of rivalry is espoused by the finality of the
arbitration process. 80  Disputes over the selection of arbitrators are quite
common and, in addition to raising the parties' tension levels, can
significantly delay the commencement of proceedings.
In 1986, Congress enacted legislation that formally recognized the need
for elevated levels of transparency in the dissemination of information
relating to instances of medical malpractice. 8' Congress decreed the
establishment of the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB) to encourage
"[s]tate licensing boards, hospitals and other health care entities, and
professional societies to identify and discipline those who engage in
unprofessional behavior." 82 Today, the NPDB is the most commonly used
database for storing and retrieving documented instances of an individual
physician's previous medical malpractice payments and history of
disciplinary actions.83 Unfortunately, public knowledge of alleged or actual
negligence by individual physicians is complicated by the application of an
enterprise theory of liability in arbitrations of medical malpractice cases
where an HMO or medical group is a named plaintiff. This is because the
application of an enterprise theory of liability prevents individual physicians
from being cataloged in the NPDB if an arbitration award is entered against
an HMO or medical group. 84 Some HMOs have responded that any
protection of privacy derived from arbitration proceedings benefits the
patient. These proponents claim that arbitration offers an advantage to
traditional lawsuits in that it protects the disclosure of patients' private
information. In reality, such privacy protections benefit HMOs and their
79. See generally William M. Sage, Health Law 2000: The Legal System And The Changing
Health Care Market, 15 HEALTH AFF. 9 (1996) (discussing how in touting the benefits of health
plan-based arbitration mechanisms, proponents of arbitration too often neglect to mention the
offsetting effects of the perceived bias of arbitrators, and duress induced from the modem
perceptions of binding arbitration).
80. See generally Rolph et al., supra note 62, at 156. There is a relatively high improbability
of successfully appealing the arbitrators' award. See id.; See also Polzer, supra note 63, at 5.
81. See The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986,42 U.S.C. § 11101 (2005).
82. National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB), http://www.npdb-hipdb.hrsa.gov/npdb.html (last
visited Oct. 20, 2007).
83. Id.; Wayne J. Guglielmo, Are Doctors Evading the Malpractice Data Bank?, 73 MED.
ECON. 52, 53 (1996). According to the former President of the Physician Insurers Association of
America, "NPDB officials acknowledge that "the number of malpractice-payment reports may have
been affected by the corporate shield effect" but the extent to which this occurs "cannot be
conclusively measured by available data." Lawrence E. Smarr, Medical Malpractice: External
Influences and Controls, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 59, 67 (1997).
84. Id. at 52.
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physicians more than patients.85 Since the monetary amount and basis of
any awards remain confidential, the election of arbitration may shield
HMOs, physicians, and hospitals from most public acknowledgments of any
potentially damaging findings of malpractice or negligence in the event of an
adverse award.8 6  In the long run, the more troubling derivation of this
inherent secrecy is the general lack of publicly-available, comparative
information by which researchers can study arbitration awards in medical
malpractice disputes. 87
IV. CURRENT LEGISLATIVE ENVIRONMENT
The emerging science of patient safety has been largely ignored by
recent calls for the expansion of existing tort reforms, most notably the use
of non-economic damage caps.88 Although some state reforms have proven
more effective than others, the IOM's call for a nationwide reporting system
still remains unanswered. 89
A. Non-Economic Damage Caps
As the cost of healthcare increases nationwide, President George W.
Bush has called on legislators to pass a nationwide $250,000 cap on non-
economic damages in medical malpractice cases. 90 The limitation of non-
economic damage awards in medical malpractice cases has been touted as a
leading tort reform solution to rising medical insurance and health care
costs. 9' According to the U.S. General Accounting Office:
85. Carter, supra note 58, at 445-46. The private nature of the arbitration between patient(s)
and physician(s), coupled with the privileged nature of communications during the arbitration,
produces an overall dearth of publicity surrounding the legal proceeding. Id. at 446. The cameras,
reporters, open transcripts, interviews, and public audience are missing-the environment in which
the arbitration occurs is most definitely private. Id.
86. Carter, supra note 58, at 446-47.
87. See id. at 447. Eventually, binding arbitration's shielding of medical errors may remove a
layer of the court's discretionary policymaking power and release the medical malpractice reform to
the whims of a laissez-faire market control. Id. at 630-31.
88. See generally Bryan A. Liang, The Adverse Event of Unaddressed Medical Error:
Identifying and Filling the Holes in the Health-Care and Legal Systems, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICs 346
(2001).
89. See id.; See also THE INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 3.
90. Fact Sheet: President Calls for Medical Liability Reform, http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2003/01/20030116.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2007). President Bush's non-economic
damage cap is closely modeled after California's 1975 Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act
(MICRA). Id.; CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West 2006).
91. PACE ET AL., supra note 67, at 47-48. Since California's enactment of the first state-level
non-economic damages cap in 1975, eleven other states have enacted similar non-economic damage
184
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After 2000, premium rates began to rise across most states on average, but more slowly
among the states with certain non-economic damage caps. In particular, from 2001 to
2002, the average rates of increase in the states with non-economic damage caps of
$250,000 and $500,000 or less were 10 and 9 percent, respectively, compared to 29
percent in the states with limited reforms.
9 2
However, it has been difficult to substantiate whether California's
Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA) has in fact reduced the
price of premiums paid by California physicians.93 As is the case with most
tort reforms, MICRA has been criticized as a metaphorical "double edged
sword." Several caveats of MICRA have been identified as having a
propensity for significant inequity. First, in cases of catastrophic medical
error, the application of non-economic damages caps may isolate the effect
of the jury award at the policymaking level.94 In these instances of
substantial error, there is a need for "carve-out" provisions. Second, the
capping of non-economic damages has shifted the perception of risks and
rewards for medical malpractice plaintiffs' attorneys by reallocating the
costs for compensating medical malpractice from defendants to plaintiffs
and their counsel. 95  This reallocation of cost has increased plaintiffs'
attorneys' selectivity of cases, and has likely prevented a subset of injured
plaintiffs from finding effective counsel on a contingency basis.
96
B. Mandatory Reporting Systems
Twenty-one states have enacted legislation requiring the mandatory
reporting of medical errors to state agencies. 9 However, these mandatory
reporting systems contain certain concessionary provisions which reinforce
the contention that physicians fear that the open reporting of medical
tort reforms. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REFORM: PERSPECTIVES ON
RECENT FINDINGS BY THE GAO 1 (2003), http://www.house.gov/jec/tort/12-04-03.pdf. A
significant difference between these states' reforms is the amount by which non-economic damages
are limited. Id. Four states limit non-economic damage awards to $250,000, while eight states limit
non-economic damage awards to an amount between $250,000 and $500,000. Id.
92. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: IMPLICATIONS OF RISING
PREMIUMS ON ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE 31 (2003).
93. PACE ET AL., supra note 67, at 47.
94. Id. at 58.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. MIMI MARCHEV, NAT'L ACAD. STATE HEALTH POL'Y, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND
MEDICAL DISCLOSURE: BALANCING FACTS AND FEARS 2 (2003); BAKER, supra note 3, at 166-67.
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mistakes will cause an increased level of litigation. 98 For instance, a recent
National Academy for State Health Policy (NASHP) survey found that most
state reporting systems exempted certain reports of medical error from
public disclosure laws, and allowed some medical errors to be reported
without associating the individual(s) involved. 99 Available evidence and
research do not indicate that these reporting systems have increased the
occurrence of medical malpractice filings in any of the respective states. i00
Nevertheless, the United States still lacks a nationwide reporting system to
supplement the NPDB.' 0'
V. THE NATIONAL MEDICAL ERROR AND COMPENSATION (MEDIC) ACT OF
2005
Senators Hillary Rodham Clinton and Barack Obama introduced Senate
Bill 1784, "The National Medical Error and Compensation (MEDiC) Act of
2005," on September 28, 2005.102 The bill extends the scope of the Patient
Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005, in order to further "promote a
culture of safety within hospitals, health systems, clinics, and other sites of
health care."10 3  The MEDiC Act's goals are fourfold: (1) to improve the
quality of health care and open communications between patients and
healthcare providers by encouraging the robust disclosure of medical errors
and patient safety events; (2) to ensure patients are offered reasonable
financial settlements for injuries caused by medical error, negligence, or
malpractice; (3) to reduce the occurrence of preventable medical errors; and
(4) to reduce the cost of medical malpractice liability insurance for
healthcare providers. 104
98. See May & Aulisio, supra note 49, at 135-36.
99. MARCHEV, supra note 98, at 2.
100. Id. at 2-5; May & Aulisio, supra note 49, at 143.
lot. See generally THE INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 3.
102. See Clinton & Obama, supra note 6.
103. The National Medical Disclosure and Compensation (MEDiC) Act of 2005, supra note 8,
at § 3. Technically, Senate Bill 1784 sought to expand certain proviso of Title IX of the Public
Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 299 et seq.), as'amended by the Patient Safety and Quality
Improvement Act of 2005 (Public Law 109-41). Id. Senator Clinton contended the bill "build[s] on
the patient safety bill that was signed into law earlier this summer by creating a voluntary program to
encourage disclosure of errors, an opportunity to enter negotiations and early settlement, while, at
the same time, protecting patients' rights and providing liability protection for healthcare providers
who participate in the program." 109 CONG. REC. S10599 (2005).
104. The National Medical Disclosure and Compensation (MEDiC) Act of 2005, S. 1784, supra
note 8, at § 932. The oft-cited 1999 IOM report supports the goals of the MEDiC Act. See
generally THE INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 3, at 1-2.
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The namesake section of the Act establishes the Medical Error
Disclosure and Compensation (MEDiC) Program. The MEDiC Program
seeks to foster an environment more conducive to the communication and
disclosure of medical errors. The crux of the program, causing considerable
debate among health care professionals and policymakers, calls for the
timely disclosure of medical errors to the patient, accompanied by an offer to
the patient to enter into negotiations for fair compensation.0 5 This reporting
and disclosure system would commence when a MEDiC program participant
becomes aware of any medical error,'0 6 patient safety event, 10 7 or notice of
legal action related to the medical liability of that participant health care
provider.'0 8 Once aware of the notification event, the participant would be
contractually required to fully disclose the suspected medical error, patient
safety event, or pending legal action to the participant's designated patient
safety officer. 109 The designated patient safety officer must then complete a
root cause analysis of the report."0 If the patient safety officer concludes
that a patient was injured or harmed as a result of medical error or any
breach of the relevant standard of care, the participant would be required to
swiftly disclose the matter to the patient verbally, and submit a full, written
disclosure to the patient."'
105. S. 1784, § 935. Senators Clinton and Obama tailored the program's disclosure and
negotiation sections around similar successful programs implemented by the University of Michigan
Health System and the Veterans Affairs (VA) Hospital in Lexington, Kentucky. See Clinton &
Obama, supra note 6. Both programs have resulted in the a significant reduction of the amount of
money spent on medical malpractice lawsuits when physicians disclosed that a medical error had in
fact occurred, and patients were offered fair monetary compensations for their injuries. Id.
According to Senator Obama, the MEDiC Program "builds on these hopeful results and incorporates
them into a national program." 109 CONG. REC. S10600 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2005) (statement of
Sen. Obama).
106. The term 'medical error' means an unexpected occurrence involving death or serious
physical or psychological injury, or the risk of such injury, including any process variation of which
recurrence may carry significant chance of a serious adverse outcome. S. 1784, § 931(4).
107. The term 'patient safety event' means an occurrence, incident, or process that either
contributes to, or has the potential to contribute to, a patient injury or degrades the ability of
healthcare providers to provide the appropriate standard of care. Id. § 931(8).
108. Id. § 935(c)(4)(B).
109. Id. § 935(b)(2).
110. Id. § 935. The root cause analysis of each report must be completed within ninety days of
the report's receipt, and must be electronically submitted to the National Patient Safety Database.
Id. § 935(c)(10).
11. Id. § 935. If a patient was harmed or injured as the result of a medical error, or as a result
of the relevant standard of care not being followed, the MEDiC program participant must disclose an
account of the incident or occurrence to the patient not later than 5 business days after becoming
17
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During the verbal disclosure to the patient, the bill directs the participant
to initiate an offer to the affected patient to commence negotiations so that
the patient can be presented with fair compensation for the adverse medical
event. 1 2  At this point, the patient must consent to an agreement for
negotiations after first acknowledging: (1) the confidentiality of such
negotiation proceedings; (2) that any "apology or expression of remorse"
during the negotiation proceedings is both confidential and inadmissible in
any "subsequent legal proceedings as an admission of guilt" if the
negotiation proceedings fail to produce a mutually accepted settlement; and
(3) that the patient does have a constitutional right to legal counsel." 3
Additionally, both parties may elect to involve a "neutral third party
mediator to facilitate" a settlement during the negotiation proceedings."
4
The initial duration of the negotiations would be limited to a six-month
period. "5 As drafted, the bill allows for a onetime extension of three
months if the initial negotiation period lapses and all parties to the
negotiation request such an extension. 1 6  If the parties do arrive at a
mutually acceptable settlement, such an agreement would be deemed a final
settlement, barring any further litigation with respect to such matters in
federal or state court. 1
7
The MEDiC Act would establish two new entities within the United
States Department of Health and Human Services charged with reducing the
occurrence of preventable medical errors." 8 The proposed Office of Patient
Safety and Health Care Quality would collaborate with the proposed Agency
for Healthcare Research and Quality to document medical error events and
suggest corresponding improvements to increase patient safety. "9  The
MEDiC Act would establish and maintain a National Patient Safety
Database (NPSD) to collect confidential patient safety data from
aware that the injury's cause. Id. § 935(c)(6). The completion status of the root cause analysis does
not affect the tolling of 5 day requirement. Id. § 935.
112. S. 1784, § 935. At the discretion of the health care provider involved, an apology or
expression of remorse may be issued to the patient. Id. § 935(c)(9)(B). At this time, the health care
provider may also elect to relay to the patient any efforts it plans to undertake in order to prevent a
similar reoccurrence. Id. § 935(c)(9)(C).
113. S. 1784, § 935(d). If the patient elects to proceed with the negotiations absent counsel, the
patient must submit "an affirmative declaration that no coercive or otherwise inappropriate action
was taken to dissuade a patient from utilizing counsel for the negotiations." Id. § 935(d)(1)(C).
114. S. 1784, § 935(d)(2).
115. Id. § 935(d)(3).
116. Id. § 935(d)(3)(B).
117. Id. § 935(d)(5).
118. Id. §§ 933-35.
119. See id. § 933(a).
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participating hospitals. 2 0 The NPSD would be electronically accessible to
participants and governmental agencies for research purposes.'2 1  The
MEDiC Act would require the regular publication of research studies to
analyze the patient safety data in the NPSD to recommend performance and
systems standards, best practices for the prevention of medical errors,
improvements to patient safety, and changes to increase the general level of
accountability within the health care system. 122
The MEDiC Act seeks to reduce the cost of medical liability insurance
for doctors, hospitals, and healthcare providers by reducing the actual rates
of preventable medical errors. 123 The primary vehicle to these ends is the
Medical Liability Insurance Study commissioned by the Director of the
MEDiC Program. 124  The study's goal is to identify, measure, and track
health care changes that have stabilized or reduced the medial liability
premiums of healthcare providers. 25  Program participants would be
required to use the savings realized by the reduction of legal defense costs to
decrease liability insurance premiums. 126 Finally, the bill takes a laissez-
faire approach to long-term insurance stabilizations in that it relies on the
insurance market's favorable response to participants' lower levels of overall
risk. 127
A. The Record
In the current legal and regulatory environment, certain derivatives of
the medical malpractice lawsuit play indispensable roles in the furtherance
120. S. 1784, §§ 934, 935(a)-(b).
121. See id. §§ 934-35.
122. S. 1784, §§ 933-939. The Director of the MEDiC Program will be responsible for the
publication of The National Patient Safety and Fair Compensation Accountability Study, The
Medical Liability Insurance Study, and The Study to Reduce the Incidence of Lawsuits Not Related
to Medical Error. Id. § 933(c)(6)-(13).
123. S. 1784, § 932. Senator Obama hopes the MEDiC Act "will help reduce medical error
rates and medical malpractice costs by opening the lines of communication between doctors and
patients--encouraging honesty and accountability in the process." 109 CONG. REc. S10596-01
(2005).
124. S. 1784, § 938.
125. Id.
126. See id. § 935(c)(2).
127. See generally BAKER, supra note 3, at 68-92. Although the very nature of the insurance
market essentially spreads the cost of loss among insured parties, the University of Michigan Health
System and Ann Arbor VA Hospitals have both negotiated lower liability insurance premiums based
on the success of their programs. Id.
189
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of patient safety initiatives. The documentation of negligence and medical
error attributable to the modem malpractice lawsuit provides an accessible
collective knowledge of past medical errors as wells as a quantifiable
sampling to measure the effectiveness of patient safety mechanisms.'28 In
order for any medical liability system to function effectively, there must be
reliable measures of medical error events by which administrators are able to
identify specific areas needing safety reforms. 129  The same database is
equally important in order to ascertain the degree to which implemented
safety improvements are effective. 3 ° Accordingly, any proposed medical
malpractice liability reform or adjudication mechanism must consider the
quality of its information management.
In many ways, the networks of information management embedded
within the MEDiC Act are superior to those of most states' present legal
system.' 3 ' The MEDiC Act would require the recording of suspected
medical errors and patient safety events. 312  After the participant's
designated patient safety officer would compile a preliminary root cause
analysis of the occurrence, 133 the report would be shared with other program
participants via the MEDiC Program's national electronic database. 34 The
primary motivation for uncovering and documenting actual medical errors
and near misses is the legitimate improvement of patient safety systems. 135
Through the robust disclosure of medical errors with thorough analysis and
128. See id. at 93-117.
129. Litigation filings are not to most effective analytical tools because: (1) most patients who
suffer a medical error do not actually sue; (2) many patients who suffer a medical error are never
made aware of that error; and (3) the filing of litigation is not necessarily correlated to the severity or
frequency of actual medical errors. See generally BAKER, supra note 3; Guglielmo, supra note 84.
Nonetheless, the litigation system is able to weed out most frivolous lawsuits. See BAKER, supra
note 3, at 77, 83-87. The remaining record of jury verdicts, coupled with internal insurance records
and hospital reports, are usually the primary sources used by administrators in deciding where
improvements to patient safety are most necessary. Id. at 71-77.
130. This is especially important because many patient safety improvements are instituted on an
economic cost-benefit basis. See generally BAKER, supra note 3; Guglielmo, supra note 84.
Measuring the designed effectiveness of such improvements is key because doctors and hospitals
face a 'double whammy' if plaintiffs prevail in subsequent litigation: the defendants are usually
liable for a portion of the attorney costs and the jury award or settlement; the defendants' liability
insurance provider will increase premiums accordingly. Id.
131. See Catherine Becker, The MEDiC Act of 2005: A New Approach to Safety, 82 AORN J.
1055, 1055 (2005).
132. The National Medical Disclosure and Compensation (MEDiC) Act of 2005, S. 1784, supra
note 8, at §§ 934(a)(4), 935(a), 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005).
133. Id. § 935(e)(2).
134. Id. §§ 934(c), 935(a).
135. Id.§ 932.
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intervention, the Act seeks to document the data necessary to attack
recurring occurrences of medical errors. 1
3 6
The MEDiC Act's medical error documentation process is modeled after
the successes of predecessor programs, such as the system of full disclosure
that has been used by the University of Michigan Health System since
2000. 37 First started at the Ann Arbor VA Medical Center, the University
of Michigan Patient Safety Enhancement Program (PSEP) is primarily
focused on increasing the quality of patient care by conducting research to
focus on methods of avoiding and preventing adverse patient outcomes and
injuries caused by the processes of the health care system. 3 8 PSEP's first
tier is the collection of reported medical errors and patient safety events. 139
In practice, this task is facilitated because administrators and doctors agree
to work together to quickly analyze and disclose medical errors to patients,
in the hope that a swift disclosure and apology would lead to a fair
compensation settlement and a drastic reduction in patient litigation
filings. 140
The PSEP uses the collected data to: "(1) conduct, synthesize, and
disseminate research aimed at reducing hospital-associated patient
complications; (2) systematically evaluate errors in processes of care that
undermine patient safety; and (3) operationalize these research findings by
systematizing methods to improve the safety of hospitalized patients."'
14 1
One of the hospital's first patient safety improvement projects was to
decrease the relatively high occurrence of infections in patients treated with
catheters. 142 The hospital used its cumulative data to diagnose the problem,
and postulate a course of corrective action. 143 The program administrator
found that although the hospital was using an appropriate FDA-approved
catheter, there existed a possibility of further reducing infections if the
136. Id.
137. See Clinton & Obama, supra note 6, at 2207.
138. Ann Arbor VA Medical Center/University of Michigan Health System Patient Safety
Enhancement Program, http://www.med.umich.edu/psep/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2007).
139. Id.
140. Carrie Hagen, A Prescription for Patient Safety, U. MiCH. HEALTH SYS., Oct. 31, 2002,
http://www.med.umich.edu/opm/newspage/2002/patsafe.htm. Doctors and administrators told the
adversely-affected patients that the data collected by program was being used to improve the
hospitals safety systems, so that any the recurrence of errors could be prevented in the near future.
Id.
141. Patient Safety Enhancement Program, supra note 139.
142. A Prescription for Patient Safety, supra note 141.
143. Id.
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hospital switched to a newly approved antiseptic coated catheter.' 44 The
hospital instituted the recommendation, and within a few months, the rate of
infections was reduced by roughly thirty-six percent. 1
45
The MEDiC Act is closely modeled on the success of the PSEP and
NPDB. In summary, the documentation, tracking, and transparency
functions of the MEDiC Act would be far superior to the modem legal
system's offering because: (1) medical professionals would be given new
incentives to disclose errors that would have previously remained
unreported; (2) hospital administrators would be able to comprehensively
compare their data on medical errors against other participants' data, and
would be able to identify and target internal systems that generate
comparatively high occurrences of medical errors; (3) the Office of Patient
Safety and Health Care Quality would be able to identify nationwide patient
safety deficiencies and recommend improvements to the United States
Department of Health and Human Services; and (4) medical malpractice
liability insurers would be able to more effectively analyze risk factors. 146
B. The Disclosure
The "culture of silence," promulgated by misconceptions of the litigious
patient and runaway juries, directly clashes with the value that modem
American society places on the open communication between doctors and
their patients. 147 This unintended consequence of the modem tort system
has been relatively unaffected by recent tort reforms, and continues to
instigate the suppression of the very information necessary to develop more
effective patient safety measures. 14' The lasting emotional trauma for
injured patients and family members is exacerbated when compounded with
perceptions of concealment and less-than-full disclosures from healthcare
providers. 149 What patients and family members desire most is an honest
and open dialogue regarding the errors that caused the injury, and an
explanation of how the healthcare provider plans on preventing future
occurrences of similar errors.' 50 It is no wonder that when patients and
family members perceive they are being told the whole truth, they are much
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See generally Becker, supra note 132.
147. See Wu et al., To Tell the Truth: Ethical and Practical Issues in Disclosing Medical
Mistakes to Patients, 12 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 770, 774 (1997).
148. See id. at 770-74.
149. Id.at771.
150. Gallagher et al., supra note 48, at 1005.
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less likely to initiate litigation.' 5 ' Unfortunately, the opinions of many
healthcare providers have not been swayed by the empirical evidence.
These professionals, the majority of which will never face a malpractice
trial, remain unwilling to make full disclosures of errors coupled with
apologies or commitments to change because they are afraid these
statements will be used in court as evidence demonstrating their
negligence. 5 2 This stalemate can be overcome only if healthcare providers
receive assurance of legal protection for their medical error disclosures.'53
The magnitude of undisclosed errors is startling. A recent national
survey indicates that only about thirty percent of respondents who suffered a
medical error were informed of that error by the responsible medical
professional. '14 This is unsurprising, considering some medical
professionals fail to disclose mistakes to patients due to a commonly held
fear that such a disclosure will be an admission of guilt and will lead to a
malpractice suit, damage professional reputation, and have no bearing on the
patient's recovery. 155  This startling statistic is even more troubling
considering that the American Medical Association instructs doctors that,
"[c]oncem regarding legal liability which might result following truthful
disclosure should not affect the physician's honesty with a patient.'
15 6
Healthcare providers should acknowledge their self-interest in candidly
disclosing medical errors to patients. A medical professional's early
disclosure of medical mistakes to affected patients may decrease the
likelihood of litigation and subsequent findings of legal liability, reduce the
likelihood of professional sanctions, and help the medical professional
accept their responsibility for the mistake. 117
151. See id.
152. Id. at 1001.
153. See id. at 1006.
154. Id. at 1001.
155. See id. at 1003-06.
156. See AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS,
CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS: ANNOTATED CURRENT OPINIONS (2007). A therapeutic privilege
exempts physicians from making detailed disclosures when such a disclosure will have a "high
likelihood of causing serious and irreversible harm to the patient." American College of Physicians,
American College ofPhysicians Ethics Manual, 117 ANN. INTERNAL MED. 947, 947-60 (3d ed.
1992).
157. See Gutheil, Bursztajn & Brodsky, Malpractice Prevention Through the Sharing of
Uncertainty: Informed Consent and the Therapeutic Alliance, 311 NEw ENG. J. MED. 49, 48-51
(1984).
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A recent study published in the Journal of General Internal Medicine
found that the nondisclosure of medical errors increased the likelihood of
patients seeking legal advice, and was associated with a more negative
emotional response. 5 8 The conservative study concluded that a policy of
robust disclosure is likely to have a positive effect on how patients respond
to medical errors.' 59 Even more persuasive evidence comes from the Patient
Safety Enhancement Program. The PSEP encourages proactive risk
reduction, and is one of the first U.S. hospital programs to train its staff in
making full disclosures of medical errors to patients. 60 The PSEP has
"reduced the number of malpractice claims pending against [its] doctors,
slashed [its] malpractice expenses, dramatically dropped the amount paid to
plaintiffs as a result of judgments or settlements, and cut the time it takes to
handle a claim."' 16' Since the PSEP was introduced, the hospital system has
reduced the number of pending malpractice suits from 260 to less than
100. 162 Other hospital systems have emulated the disclosure policies of
PSEP, which are highlighted in a new training film designed to instruct
medical staffers how to make effective error disclosures. 1
63
C. The Power of Empathy
Malpractice suits often result when a medical error is met with a lack of
empathy from physicians and hospital staff.' 64  However, when an
expression of sympathy or apology is given to patients and their family
members in conjunction with the disclosure of medical error, they are less
likely to sue. 165 The Pew Demonstration Mediation and ADR Project has
substantiated that different categories of apologies have very different
effects in a disclosure setting. 166 Apologies of sympathy convey the notion
158. Kathleen Mazor et al., Disclosure of Medical Errors: What Factors Influence How
Patients Respond?, 21 J. GEN. INT. MED. 704, 707-10 (2006).
159. See id. The study concluded that full disclosures most often had a positive effect on how
patients responded to medical errors. Id. In some instances of disclosure, there was no change
between the patient's reaction when the disclosure was given, compared to when the disclosure was
withheld. Id. Only in rare circumstances did the patient respond more negatively. Id.
160. The University of Michigan Health System (UMHS) Approach to Malpractice Claims,
http://www.med.umich.edu/news/umhsm.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2007). UMHS uses a 'triad'
approach which stresses communication, full disclosure, and learning from experience. Id.
161. Id.
162. Laura Landro, The Informed Patient: Doctors Learn to Say 'I'm Sorry', WALL ST. J., Jan.
24, 2007, at D5.
163. See id.
164. See Clinton & Obama, supra note 6.
165. See Gallagher et al., supra note 48.
166. Liebman & Hyman, supra note 5, at 27.
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of objective empathy for a patient's situation. 167 An apology of sympathy
may resemble a statement akin to "'I'm sorry this happened to you."",
168
Apologies of responsibility connote some type of fault, on behalf of the
individual making the apology, for the events which injured the patient. 69
An apology of responsibility may be expressed as "'I'm sorry we did this to
you." 170 Injured patients and their family members are much more likely to
respond favorably to apologies of responsibility than apologies of
sympathy.' 17  However, healthcare providers are far less likely to give an
apology of responsibility because of the perception of legal liability that may
attach to it. '
72
This conundrum of empathy has spurred the Joint Commission on
Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations to recommend the extension of
legislation to protect disclosure and apology from being used as evidence of
liability in the event of ensuing litigation against the apologizer or associated
healthcare provider. 173  Twenty-nine states have enacted laws which, to
varying degrees, disallow the introduction of expressions of sympathy after
accidents as proof of liability in a state court of law. 174 The MEDiC Act
synthesizes these diverse "apology laws" into national legislation applicable
to voluntary program participants. Under the bill, any apology offered by a
healthcare provider during the negotiations provided for by the Act, shall be
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. See id. at 27-28.
172. See id. at 28.
173. Innovative Solutions to Medical Liability: Hearing Before the House Committee on Energy
and Commerce, Subcommittee on Health, 109th Cong. 117 (2006) (testimony of Margaret
VanAmringe, M.H.S. Vice President, Public Policy and Government Relations Joint Commission on
Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations).
174. ARiZ. REV. STAT., § 12-2605 (2005); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1160 (2006); COLO. REV. STAT. §
13-25-135 (2003); 2005 Conn. Pub. Acts 05-275; FLA. STAT. § 90.4026 (2001); GA. CODE ANN. §
24-3-37.1 (2005); HAW. REV. STAT. § 626-1 (2006); LA. REV.STAT. § 3715.5 (2005); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch.233, § 23D (1986); MD. CODE ANN., CTS., & JUD. PROC. § 10-920 (2004); ME. REV STAT.
ANN. tit. 24, § 2908 (2005); N. C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1 (2007); N. H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-E:4
(2005); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.43 (2004); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-1708.IH (2004); OR.
REV. STAT. § 677.082 (2003); S. C. CODE ANN. § 19-1-190 (2006); TENN. EVID. RULE § 409.1
(2003); TEXAS CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 18.061 (1999); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-52.1 (2005); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1912 (2006); WASH. REV. CODE § 5.66.010 (2002); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-
130 (2004). These "apology laws" essentially allow doctors to say 'I'm sorry' without the apology
being used against them in malpractice suits. See generally Clinton & Obama, supra note 6.
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kept confidential. 7 ' Any such apology would be shielded to the extent it
would be prohibited from introduction in any subsequent legal proceedings
as an admission of guilt or culpability in the event those negotiations ended
without an offer and acceptance of compensation. 1
76
The MEDiC Act recognizes that when a healthcare provider decides to
disclose a medical error to an effected patient, the outcome of that disclosure
is largely determined by how effectively the healthcare provider meets the
patient's empathetic needs.' 77 Although the MEDiC Act leaves individual
health care organizations and providers much discretion as to what form of
apology is given, if any, most program participants will likely find it is in the
best interest of themselves and their patients to convey some notion of
lasting empathy to effected patients. 17 8  For example, the Children's
Hospitals and Clinics of Minnesota adopted a full-disclosure program that
incorporated the successes of the Michigan's PSEP and Ann Arbor VA's
disclosure program. 179 Children's Hospitals' process of disclosure and truth-
175. The National Medical Disclosure and Compensation (MEDiC) Act of 2005, S. 1784, supra
note 8, at § 935(d)(1)(b), 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005).
An agreement that any apology or expression of remorse by a doctor or other designated
health care provider at any time during the negotiations shall be kept confidential and
shall not be used in any subsequent legal proceedings as an admission of guilt if such
negotiations end without an offer of compensation that is acceptable to both parties.
Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. Healthcare providers' behavior during a disclosure of medical error influences the
patient's perception of the health care organization and can be a pinnacle point in a patient's
formulation of how to react to the disclosure. JULIE MORATH & TERRY HART, PARTNERING WITH
FAMILIES: DISCLOSURE AND TRUST, 2-5, http://www.npsf.org/download/Morath.pdf. Similarly,
Senator Obama urges that "[w]hen patients are treated with respect and told the truth, they sue less.
More are actually compensated for their injuries... and health care professionals actually learn from
their mistakes so they're not repeated and lives are saved." 109 CONG. REc. S 10600 (daily ed. Sept.
28, 2005) (statement of Sen. Obama). Senator Clinton commented that "[m]alpractice suits often
result when an unexpected adverse outcome is met with a lack of empathy from physicians and a
perceived or actual withholding of essential information." Clinton & Obama, supra note 6, at 2205-
07.
178. S. 1784, § 935(c)(9)(c). Patients and physicians both have unmet needs following a
medical error event. Gallagher et al., supra note 44, at 1005. Patients generally desire the disclosure
of all harmful errors and seek elaboration as to what exactly happened, why the error occurred, what
remedial efforts can be undertaken to minimize the impact of the error, and how the health care
provider plans on preventing future recurrences of similar errors. Id. at 1004. Patients have an
unmet emotional need during a disclosure and desire genuine, lasting emotional support-more than
a passing apology- Id. at 1005. Physicians generally want to provide an apology and subsequent
emotional support to effected patients, but many fail to do so because they worry that an apology
might create legal liability. Id. However, when physicians feel shielded from such legal liability,
they are more likely to provide these forms of emotional support. Id.
179. See MORATH & HART, supra note 178.
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telling begins with an apology. 8 °  Emotional support is subsequently
maintained throughout the disclosure process. 18'1 Healthcare providers
convey what actions will be taken to treat or ameliorate the consequences of
the accident. 82 Patients are provided hospital-appointed counselors, and are
offered private counselors at their discretion. 183 At the completion of the
disclosure, healthcare providers tell patients that any charges and expenses
related to the accident will be born by the hospital and that the hospital will
provide family members with accommodations and will seek to compensate
any actual damages related to the error. 
8 4
VI. CONCLUSION
Reforming the legal landscape of medical malpractice is an arduous
endeavor. The precarious nature of medical malpractice tort cases presents
an interesting dilemma that must be addressed if legislation is to be
effective. Malpractice torts are unique because they begin with a situation in
which a physician performs a certain plan of care, having some measurable
risk, for the benefit of an unhealthy patient. The quandary of tort reform
exists in the necessity of reallocating the risks and rewards of the medical
malpractice system. Patients' rights advocates must never forget that a
physician's primary motivation is the safe and effective treatment of their
patients. Most physicians never commit an act of gross negligence. Instead,
the majority of medical errors occur because of system-level deficiencies or
human errors that do not amount to a legal standard of negligence. When
most physicians recognize an error that has harmed a patient, they desire to
truthfully, objectively, and professionally disclose these errors. However,
the studies cited in this paper emphasize that physicians define these errors
more narrowly than patients and choose the verbiage of their disclosures
very carefully, fearing the potential for litigation. 85  Although physicians
are generally upset by the fact that a patient was harmed by preventable
error, many are still concerned that proffering an apology will create a legal
liability that outweighs its worth. 1
86
180. See id. at 6-7.
181. See id. at 4-8.
182. See id. at 7.
183. See id.
184. See id. at 7-8.
185. Gallagher et al., supra note 48, at 1003.
186. Id.
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Alternatively, physicians and other healthcare providers must approach
tort reform without losing perspective of their patients' ultimate needs and
motivations. Patients desire the disclosure of all medical errors and most
"near misses." Moreover, patients define "medical errors" much more
broadly than healthcare providers. 87  Patients value a physician's
truthfulness and compassion during a disclosure and generally are more
concerned with learning of possible restorative and preventative measures
than hearing excuses. 188 Patients desire an apology but note that such an
apology should be personal and genuine rather than objective and
transitory. 1
89
The great strength of the MEDiC Act is its ability to provide the
incentives necessary to align the attitudes, needs, and motivations of
physicians with their patients. By standardizing the liability protection for
participating healthcare providers who disclose known medical errors to
their patients and the NPSD, the bill may be the first breakthrough medical
malpractice tort reform of the twenty-first century. Unlike other tort reforms
that supply utility for healthcare providers at the expense of patients, the
MEDiC Act focuses on the long-term improvement of patient safety. By
reviving the use of alternative dispute resolution tactics to meet the
informational and emotional needs of patients, the Clinton-Obama approach
to medical malpractice reform presents a meaningful step towards bridging
the discord between physicians and patients, while offering effective
incentives for change.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
198
28
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol8/iss1/6
